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DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES IN MINNESOTA: THE
APPLICATION OF THE GARN ACT AFTER VIERECK
P. PEOPLES SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION
Since the Depression of the 1930s, lending institutions have routinely included
due-on-sale clauses in their mortgage instruments to protect their security interests.
In recent years, issues of federal preemption have generated a great deal of confus-
sion regarding the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. In Viereck v. Peoples
Savings & Loan Association, the Minnesota Supreme Court added to this con-
fusion. This Note thoroughly discusses the legislation and case law in this area
and analyzes the efect of Viereck on the Minnesota real estate market.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 1984, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Viereck v. Peo-
ples Savings & Loan Association. I Vtiereck drastically affects transfers of real
estate in Minnesota until October, 1985. The court held that the Garn-
1. 343 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1984).
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St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 19822 (Garn Act), which per-
mits the acceleration of due-on-sale clauses with a few exceptions, does
not apply retroactively to Minnesota mortgages executed prior to June 1,
1979.3 The court also held that federal law does not preempt Minnesota
law governing conventional real estate mortgage due-on-sale clauses exe-
cuted before June 1, 1979, even where the original state-chartered mort-
gagee subsequently acquired a federal charter or assigned the mortgage
to a federally-chartered savings and loan association. a Therefore, under
Viereck, a lender holding a conventional mortgage, executed or trans-
ferred before June 1, 1979 on a borrower-occupied home, may not accel-
erate payment or charge a higher interest rate when the home is sold
unless it is necessary to protect the mortgagee's security interest.5 This
result is surprising in view of the broad preemptive effect of the Garn
Act.6 Vzereck may stand for the Minnesota Supreme Court's attempt to
salvage pro-consumer mortgage law in the face of the pro-lender stance
of the Garn Act and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations
promulgated pursuant to the Act.
The Viereck decision and its interpretation of the Garn Act cannot be
viewed in a vacuum. Accordingly, this Note shall approach the Viereck
decision by tracing the history of the due-on-sale clause from its early
origins through the litigation of the 1960's and 1970's which culminated
in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fidelity Federal Savigs &
Loan Association v. de la Cuesta.7 This Note examines the Garn Act, its
legislative history, and the initial confusion this legislation caused in
Minnesota. It then turns to the regulations implemented by the Bank
Board in 1983 and analyzes their pro-mortgagee effect in Minnesota.
The Note concludes with an analysis of the Viereck decision against this
background.
II. THE DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSE
A. Early Origins
The due-on-sale clause is an acceleration clause commonly used in
mortgage instruments.8 It allows the mortgagee to accelerate the matur-
2. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (1982). The portions of the Garn Act applicable to this Note are codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3 (West Supp. 1983).
3. Viereck, 343 N.W.2d at 34-35; see infra note 275 and accompanying text. The Ver-
eck court also held that state-chartered lenders may not circumvent state restrictions by
selling mortgages to federal savings and loan associations or by acquiring a federal charter.
Id at 34; see infra note 277 and accompanying text.
4. See id
5. See id. at 34-35.
6. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983).
7. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
8. Thornburg, The Due-On-Sale Clause: Current Legislative Actions and Probable Trends, 9
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ity of the loan upon the sale or alienation of the real property securing
the loan.9 Lending institutions across the United States include due-on-
sale clauses in their mortgages to protect their security interests.' 0
1. History of the Due-On-Sale Clause
In the United States, the validity of the due-on-sale clause was first
addressed I in 1898 in Board of Church Erection Fund v. First Presbyterian
Church of Seattle.12 In Board of Church Erection Fund, the plaintiff financed
the construction of the defendant's church.13 The parties' agreement
contained an acceleration clause calling for payment of the total princi-
pal if the church was sold or abandoned, or ceased being used as a house
of worship. 14 The Washington Supreme Court held that the clause was a
reasonable restraint on alienation and therefore enforceable. 15
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 645, 646 (1981). See Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 480 (Minn. 1981). According to the Hohday Acres court,
A due-on-sale clause is a mortgage payment acceleration clause which requires
the borrower to obtain the consent of the lender prior to the disposition of the
borrower's interest and which permits the lender, by exercising its option to deny
consent, to declare the entire balance due and owing.
Holiday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 480.
9. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw 295
(1979). An acceleration clause empowers the lender to declare the whole amount of the
mortgage debt due and payable in the event of a default by the borrower. Such defaults
include failure to pay installments on the note, failure to pay taxes, failure to maintain
insurance, and failure to keep the property in repair. Id. at 435. Other events, such as the
borrower's failure to pay public assessments, may give rise to acceleration by the lender if
provided for in the contract. See Note, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique on the Role of
Equity in the Enforcement of Modem-Day "Due-On-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. REv. 485, 485
(1973).
Without a due-on-sale clause in financing documents, the mortgagee could not accel-
erate the debt upon sale. See Young v. Hawks, 624 P.2d 235, 237 (Wyo. 1981) (improper
to imply a due-on-sale clause where none exists in mortgage agreement).
10. Casenote, Mortgages. Due-On-Sale Clause, Restraint on Alenation-Enforceabity, 28
CASE W. RES. 493, 503 (1978). "In 1970, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
conducted a survey of conventional mortgages. . . and found that over two-thirds of such
mortgages included due-on-sale clauses." Id at 503 n.1.
11. While the due-on-sale clause currently enjoys widespread use, legal scholars have
been unable to document its advent in English law. ABA Committee on Real Estate
Financing, Enforcement of Due-on-Transfer Clauses, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 891, 893
(1978). Under feudal law, "a pure and genuine feud could not be transferred from one
feudatory to another without the consent of the lord; lest thereby a feeble or suspicious
tenant might have been substituted and imposed upon him to perform the feudal serv-
ices." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *287. These restrictions were in general re-
moved by the Statute of Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw. I, ch. 1 (1290), which codified
the doctrine prohibiting restraints on the alienation of real property. See 47 MISs. L.J.
331, 333 (1976).
12. 19 Wash. 455, 53 P. 671 (1898).
13. Id at 458, 53 P. at 672.
14. Id
15. Id. at 461, 53 P. at 673. The court concluded that:
The mortgagors are not prevented from selling the property. No restrictions are
1985]
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In another early due-on-sale case, Tidwell v. Wittmeier,16 the Alabama
Supreme Court considered the validity of a due-on-sale clause. In Tid-
well, the mortgage provided that all the installment payments would be-
come due when the mortgagor sold the land.17 The court held that the
clause was enforceable under a plain language interpretation of the
mortgage.18 This paucity of early case law can be attributed to the gen-
eral absence of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage instruments prior to the
1930's. '9
2. The Due-On-Encumbrance Clause
Another form of acceleration provision, the due-on-encumbrance
clause, allows lenders to declare the entire debt due if the mortgagor
places additional liens upon the real property. 20 The use of the due-on-
encumbrance clause, once commonly included in mortgage instru-
ments,2 1 declined after the California Supreme Court's decision in LaSala
v. American Savings &Loan Associalon.22 In LaSala, the court held that the
risk to the senior mortgagee's interest arising from a junior lien did not
justify an automatic acceleration of the debt, thereby destroying the use-
fulness of the due-on-encumbrance clause. 2 3
entailed upon it. But the effect of the stipulation or condition expressed simply is
that, if it is alienated or abandoned, or not used for the purposes for which the
money was loaned, the mortgage becomes due; if a sale were made, it would
simply be made subject to the mortgage.
Id
16. 150 Ala. 253, 43 So. 782 (1907).
17. Id at 258, 43 So. at 783.
18. Id The court reasoned, "This clause was put in the mortgage for a purpose, and
the parties thereto were bound by it. It is not within the power of this court to make
contracts for parties." Id
19. Goddard, Non-Assignment Provilrions in Land Contracts, 31 MICH. L. REv. 1, 7-8
(1932); see also Merriam v. Leeper, 192 Iowa 587, 593, 185 N.W. 134, 137 (1921) (court
referred to due-on-sale clause as an uncommon provision).
20. For examples of cases discussing due-on-encumbrance clauses, see LaSala v.
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971); and
Occidental Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843
(1980). The Nebraska Supreme Court pointed out that a due-on-encumbrance clause "is
essentially the same as a 'due-on-sale' clause, except that the triggering mechanism is the
placing of a subsequent lien or encumbrance upon the mortgaged property." 206 Neb. at
470-71, 293 N.W.2d at 844.
21. See Thornburg, supra note 7, at 646; see also R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, MOD-
ERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 206-07 (2d ed. 1981). The clause originated to pro-
tect against the financial hazard posed to the senior mortgagee. The junior lien usually
carries a higher interest rate and has a shorter maturity. This additional financial pressure
may force the mortgagor to default on both mortgages. See d. at 206-07.
22. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
23. Id. at 881, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860; see also Thornburg, supra note 8,
at 646 (citing LaSala as the first decision refusing to enforce due-on-encumbrance clauses).
[Vol. 1 I
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B. The Effects of the Depression
The financial collapse of the Depression triggered the widespread use
of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage transactions.24 During the Depres-
sion, lending institutions found their assets tied up in real estate mort-
gages which could not be converted into cash quickly enough to pay
depositors. 25 Lenders that remained open during the Depression reacted
to the lack of liquid assets by ceasing to make home mortgage loans.26 In
response to these dire conditions, Congress created the Federal Housing
Administration and authorized it to provide mortgage insurance in order
to make home financing available.27 This measure induced some cau-
tious lending-at least more than would have occurred without the
safety of the government insurance.28
The limited availability of home financing prompted Congress to en-
act legislation to stimulate mortgage lending.2 9 In 1932, Congress en-
acted the Federal Home Loan Bank Act 30 (Bank Act). The Bank Act
established a nationwide system of federal institutions to originate home
mortgages directly to borrowers.3i The Bank Act provided federal assist-
ance and loan advances to encourage the development of new thrift insti-
tutions32 in areas where state-chartered lending institutions were unable
to fully serve the demand for mortgage financing.33 In 1933, Congress
enacted the Home Owners' Loan Act 34 (HOLA) to stabilize the home
loan market and to protect borrowers from threatening state laws.35
HOLA also established the Federal Home Loan Bank Board3 6 (Bank
24. Kratovil, A New Dilemma for Thrift Institutions. Judicial Emasculation of the Due-On-
Sale Clause, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 299 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kratovill.
25. Id; see also Comment, Due-On-Sale Clauses and Restraints on Alienation: Does Wel-
lenkamp Apply to Federal Institutions?, 11 PAC. L.J. 1085, 1103 (1980) (discussion of how
California has dealt with due-on-sale clauses). By 1933, 1700 state savings and loan as-
sociations had failed, causing $200 million in losses, approximately one-third the value of
savings in these institutions. See H. R. CONF. REP. No. 210, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., 77
CONG. REc. 2499 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Reilly).
26. See Kratovil, supra note 24, at 299. Kratovil notes that many banks that were




29. T. MARVELL, THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD 18-25 (1969).
30. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1421-1444 (1976)).
31. Id § 1424.
32. See T. MARVELL, supra note 29, at 20-24.
33. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 10 (1933); T. MARVELL, supra note
29, at 20-27.
34. Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (1933) (codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1982)).
35. See id.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board is an independent federal regulatory agency
19851
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Board) which promulgated regulations to "provide for the organization,
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to
be known as 'Federal savings and loan associations.' "37
C. Modem Form of the Clause
Lending institutions that survived the Depression, as well as the new
associations created by HOLA, gradually began mortgage financing.38
Lenders included due-on-sale clauses in notes39 and mortgage instru-
ments40 to avoid the problems experienced at the outset of the
Depression.
The early, unsophisticated due-on-sale clause was one of several provi-
sions in a general acceleration clause.41 The clause granted the lender
the right to accelerate the debt if the property was sold without the
lender's consent. 4 2 The clause assured the lender, who had financed a
purchase by a creditworthy individual, that the property would only be
sold to another creditworthy individual.
43
Early decisions focused solely on the due-on-sale provision in the gen-
eral acceleration clause.44 Because of this judicial attention the due-on-
sale clause began to appear as a separate provision, drafted more
created in 1932 to administer the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA). The Bank
Board is authorized to provide for the organization, examination, and regulation of fed-
eral savings and loan associations. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976). In 1976 the FHLBB issued
due-on-sale regulations which provide that:
A Federal association continues to have the power to include, as a matter of
contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instruments
whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable
all of the sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part
of the real property securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower with-
out the association's prior written consent.
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1983) (repealed 1983).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1982).
38. Kratovil, supra note 24, at 299.
39. See BERNHARDT, THE OBLIGATION IN CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS § 4.55 at 182-83 (1970). Bernhardt explains the significance of inserting
the clause in both the note and the mortgage. One commentator points out that including
the clause in the deed of trust imports constructive notice to subsequent purchasers by
virtue of recordation, and including a clause in the note binds all parties who sign or
guarantee the note. Id
40. Kratovil, supra note 24, at 299-300.
41. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Il. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1
(1975). In Baker the mortgage included a broad covenant in which the mortgagor agreed:
(8) not to suffer or permit without written permission or consent of the mortga-
gee being first had and obtained . ..
(d) a sale, assignment or transfer of any right, title or interest in and to said
property or any portion thereof.
Id. at 121, 333 N.E.2d at 2.
42. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 21, § 14.08 at 204.
43. Id.
44. Kratovil, supra note 24, at 302.
[Vol. I I
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Although lenders placed greater emphasis on drafting due-on-sale
clauses, most clauses written prior to 1975 contained varied language. 4
6
In addition, many of the provisions did not contain specific language
giving the lender an option to increase the interest rate upon an assign-
ment of the mortgage.47 In 1970, Congress directed the Federal National
Mortgage Assocation (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC) to draft a uniform mortgage instrument. 48 The
congressional directive was based on the secondary mortgage market's
need for a uniform instrument. 49 In June, 1975, the Uniform Mortgage
Instrument was released. Paragraph 17 of the Uniform Mortgage Instru-
ment 50 contains the FNMA/FHLMC standard due-on-sale clause which
45. Id. at 302-03.
46. See Blocher, Due-On-Sale in the Secondagy Mortgage Market, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 49,
55 (1981).
47. See Comment, Dunham v. Ware Savings Bank: Economic Polcy and Federal Law
Juisti Enforcement of Due-On-Sale clauses by State-Chartered Savings Institutions, 35 ME. L. REV.
147, 148 (1983).
48. S. REP. No. 761, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprtnledtn 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3488, 3494-95; H.R. REP. No. 1131, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
49. S. Doc. No. 21, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. iii (1971) (Senator Sparkman stated that "a
uniform instrument was essential to the development of a viable secondary mortgage
market.").
50. A due-on-sale clause is defined in the Garn Act as a "contract provision which
authorizes a lender, at his option, to declare due and payable sums secured by the lender's
security instrument if all or any part of the property, or an interest therein, securing the
real property loan is sold or transferred without the lender's prior written consent." 12
U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(a)(1) (West Supp. 1983). The most common due-on-sale clause format
used in the market today, known as "Paragraph 17," is that used by the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (Fannie Mae) which provides:
17. TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY; ASSUMPTION. If all or any part
of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without
Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation of a lien or encum-
brance subordinate to this Deed of Trust, (b) the creation of a purchase money
security interest for household appliances, (c) a transfer by devise, descent or by
operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the grant of any lease-
hold interest of three years or less not containing an option to purchase, Lender
may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be
immediately due and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to acceler-
ate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the Property
is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit of such
person is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on the sums secured
by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has
waived the option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if Borrower's
successor in interest has executed written assumption agreement accepted in
writing by Lender, Lender shall release Borrower from all obligations under this
Mortgage and the Note.
If Lender exercises such option to accelerate, Lender shall mail Borrower notice
of acceleration in accordance with paragraph 14 hereof. Such notice shall pro-
vide a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is mailed within
which Borrower may pay the sums declared due. If Borrower fails to pay such
19851
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is used in most residential mortgage instruments today.5 1
D. Modem Lt'ligation
Until the mid-1960's there was little litigation concerning due-on-sale
clauses. 52 The rise in the number of lawsuits challenging the enforce-
ment of the clause paralleled the inflationary rise of mortgage interest
rates. 53 Before this inflationary increase in the rate of interest, mortagees
would generally not enforce a due-on-sale clause unless the subsequent
buyer was not creditworthy. 54 In 1966, 1970, and 1974, disintermedia-
tion55 occurred when depositors withdrew their funds from savings ac-
counts and placed them in other investments offering higher rates of
return. 56 Disintermediation, coupled with the advent of inflationary in-
creases in interest rates, caused lenders to enforce due-on-sale clauses in
order to realize market interest on loans that would normally have been
locked in at below-market rates for long amortization periods. 57 Enforc-
sums prior to the expiration of such period, Lender may, without further notice
or demand on Borrower, invoke any remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof.
Squires, A Comprehensive Due-on-Sale Clause (withform), 27 PRAC. LAW., Apr. 15, 1981, at 67,
71-72.
51. Comment, supra note 47, at 150.
52. Cf Bonnano, Due On Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in Calforwna
in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REv. 267, 274
(1972) (noting few reported California cases). The absence of litigation may have been
due to the relative stability of interest rates at that time. See Bartke & Tagaropulos, Michi-
gan s Looking Glass World of Due-On-Sale Clauses, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 971, 976-77 (1978)
(interest rates were reasonably stable from 1961 to 1965).
53. According to a Department of Commerce abstract, interest rates on conventional












UNITED STATES DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
545 (101st ed. 1980).
54. See Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 52, at 979.
55. Disintermediation is simply that point in time when interest rates, particularly
those on government securities, rise to a point where money flows out of savings institu-
tions and into government securities, thereby preventing savings institutions from making
mortgage loans. Dall, The Conventional Mortgage-backed Security, FNMA/FHLMC GENERAL
COUNSELS' CONFERENCE 159-60 (1978).
56. R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 21, at 204.
57. Williams v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981). Interest
rate fluctuation is the principal underlying characteristic of home lending activities which
[Vol. I I
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ing due-on-sale clauses guaranteed lenders that their loans would carry
present market interest rates, thereby increasing the yield on their mort-
gage portfolios.
58
Early decisions generally upheld the lender's right to a enforce a due-
on-sale clause unless the result would have been unconscionable. 59
Mortgagors usually argued that the lender's use of the clause amounted
to an illegal restraint of their right to freely alienate their property.
Mortgagors also claimed that if they were allowed to transfer a mortgage
with a below-market interest rate, it would increase the number of poten-
tial buyers as well as the price of their property.6 0 In contrast, if the
lender could demand a higher rate of interest upon the transfer of the
property, the economic attractiveness of the transaction for potential
purchasers would decrease. 6' In response to these arguments, early opin-
ions concluded that no restraint occurred, and that the financing was
totally separate from the property itself.62 Later decisions, however, did
leads lenders to insist on due-on-sale clauses. See id at 914. But see Volkmer, The Applica-
tion of the Restraints on Alenation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV.
747, 770 (1973) (interest rate considerations were an original purpose behind the develop-
ment of due-on-sale clauses).
58. See Holiday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 481.
59. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980). A due-on-sale clause was enforceable as a reasonable restraint on
alienation only if enforcement was not inequitable or unjust under the circumstances. Id.
at 160; see also Baker, 61 111. 2d at 126, 333 N.E.2d at 5 (court of equity may relieve bor-
rower from effect of due-on-sale clause when exercise of clause is result of unconscionable
or inequitable conduct by lender; an attempt to impose excessive interest rate in relation
to market rate would be unconscionable); Occidental, 206 Neb. at 482, 293 N.W.2d at 850
(enforcement of due-on-sale clause is valid absent evidence that enforcement would be
inequitable); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722, 725, 433 A.2d 1312,
1314 (1981) (due-on-sale clauses contained in mortgage instruments are not per se inva-
lid); Mutual Real Est. Inv. Trust v. Buffalo Sav. Bank, 90 Misc. 2d 675, 678, 395 N.Y.S.2d
583, 586 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (court of equity may refuse to enforce due-on-sale clauses
under certain circumstances); Stith v. Hudson City Say. Inst., 63 Misc. 2d 863, 866, 313
N.Y.S.2d 804, 808 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (due-on-sale clause was not a forfeiture or penalty
and therefore was fair and legal); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620,
630-31, 224 S.E.2d 580, 587 (1976) (due-on-sale clause was valid and enforceable absent
proof that lender acted fraudulently, inequitably, oppressively, or unconscionably); Sonny
Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333, 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (Texas
courts have not permitted enforcement of acceleration clauses activated by a lender's
fraudulent and inequitable conduct).
60. Bartke & Tagaropulos, supra note 52, at 981-82.
61. Bonnano, supra note 52, at 284-85.
62. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 301, 509 P.2d
1240, 1244 (1973); Baker, 61 111. at 125, 333 N.E. 2d at 4; Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md. 42,
50, 227 A.2d 26, 31 (1967); First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 365, 550
P.2d 1271, 1272 (1976); Poydan, Inc. v. Agia Kiriaki, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 141, 150, 325
A.2d 838, 843 (1974); Mutual RealEstate, 90 Misc. 2d at 678, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 586; Crockett,
289 N.C. at 630-31, 224 S.E.2d at 587; Peoples Say. Ass'n v. Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio
App. 2d 35, 38, 257 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1970); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah
2d 383, 386, 490 P.2d 328, 329 (1971).
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not allow enforcement of the clause unless the mortgagee demonstrated
that the proposed transfer threatened to impair its security interest in the
mortgaged property. 63
In hopes of clarifying the controversy between mortgagees and mort-
gagors regarding due-on-sale clauses, the Bank Board promulgated regu-
lations (1976 Regulations) 64 which generally allowed the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses by federally-chartered savings and loans.65 The 1976
Regulations, however, came under judicial scrutiny on the issue of
whether the regulations had the effect of preempting state restrictions on
the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. In Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest
Federal Savings & Loan Associat'On,66 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
63. See Patton v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 479, 578 P.2d 152, 158
(1978) (due-on-sale clause enforceable only upon beneficiary's showing that security was
jeopardized by a transfer of the property; without such a showing, enforcement would be
an unlawful restraint on alienation); Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582
P.2d 970, 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 384 (1978) (impairment of security must be established
in order to exercise clause); Woodcrest Apartments, Ltd. v. IPA Realty Partners, 397 So.
2d 364, 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73
Mich. App. 163, 174, 250 N.W.2d 804, 809 (1977) (where sole basis for enforcement of
due-on-sale clause was lender's interest in maintaining its loan portfolio at current interest
rates, restraint on the mortgagor's ability to alienate was unreasonable); State ex re. Bin-
gaman v. Valley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 97 N.M. 8, 12, 636 P.2d 279, 283 (1981) (court held
there was no enforcement without showing of substantial impairment to lender's security
interest); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 441-42,
553 P.2d 1090, 1092 (1976) (increased risk to lender allowed enforcement of due-on-sale
clause); cf. Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977)
(equitable powers of court will not impose penalty on mortgagor without a showing he has
violated the substance of the agreement).
64. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1982) (repealed 1983). This section provided:
Due-on-sale clauses. [A federal savings and loan] association continues to have the
power to include, as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provi-
sion in its loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare
immediately due and payable sums secured by the association's security instru-
ment if all or any part of the real property securing the loan is sold or transferred
by the borrower without the associations' [sic] prior written consent. Except as
[otherwise] provided in . . . this section . . . exercise by the association of such
option (hereinafter called a due-on-sale clause) shall be exclusively governed by
the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies of the association and
borrower shall be fixed and governed by the contract.
Id.
65. Id § 54 5.8 -3 (g) (1982) (repealed 1983). This section provided:
Litations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. With respect to any loan made after
July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be occupied by the bor-
rower, a Federal association (1) shall not exercise a due-on-sale clause because of
(i) creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's secur-
ity instrument; (ii) creation of a purchase money security interest for household
appliances; (iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a
joint tenant; or (iv) granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not
containing an option to purchase.
Id
66. 308 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. 1981).
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that there was no federal preemption.6 7
I. Holiday Acres
In Hoh'day Acres, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the impact
of the 1976 Regulations on due-on-sale clause acceleration by holding
that the 1976 Regulations did not preempt state law because neither
Congress nor the Bank Act expressly provided for preemption of state law
regarding the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.68 The court reasoned
that "[h]ome loan mortgages, and the inclusion of due-on-sale clauses in
those mortgages, are matters of traditional state interest and concern." 69
The court stated that federal law would not supersede the historic police
powers of the state "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." 70 The court also inquired into the possibility of implied pre-
emption by Congress and held that the 1976 Regulations were not evi-
dence of any congressional intent to fully occupy the field.71 Indeed, the
congressional intent on the issue of preemption was entirely unclear.72
The court's findings are supported by the legislative history underlying
the 1976 Regulations. In 1933 the Chairman of the Bank Board stated
at a House hearing that the Bank Board would not preempt state law. 7 3
On the other hand, the legislative history of the HOLA demonstrated
that Congress intended the Bank Board to have broad powers to admin-
ister the Bank Act. 74 Nevertheless, the Minnesota court was correct in
finding that the legislative intent was ambiguous since there is no clear
congressional intent to preempt state law.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that lenders, particularly
in residential financing, use due-on-sale clauses as leverage "to negotiate
a higher rate of interest or, in the alternative . . . to declare the entire
67. Id at 477.
68. Id
69. Id at 475.
70. Id at 476 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
71. 308 N.W.2d at 478.
72. Note, Enforceability of Federal Savings and Loan Association Due-On-Sale Clauses: Holhday
Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1141, 1146
(1982).
73. H.R. REP. No. 4980, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1933) (statement of William F.
Stevenson, Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board). According to Chairman
Stevenson,
These associations will be federally chartered and the regulations as to how these
things will be done are drawn by the board and put into effect. But they would
be very careful, I should say. I know I would as a member of the board, be very
careful in authorizing them to do things that they were not authorized to do
under state law. I do not think that would be our policy.
Id, see also Holiday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 476-77.
74. See 77 CONG. REC. at 2481 (statement of Rep. Luce) ("We give the board great
power to administer the Act."); see also Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F.
Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (plenary authority granted by Congress to the Board evidences
exclusive control sufficient for federal preemption).
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balance due and owing, thereby obtaining the funds to lend at higher
existing interest rates." 75 By forcing refinancing at current interest rates,
the mortgagee collects more money for profit or lending to other borrow-
ers. 76 The disadvantaged borrower-seller is, therefore, forced to lower
the selling price of his home to compensate for the higher financing costs
to a potential buyer or to forego selling his property.
77
Even though Holiday Acres involved a loan to finance investment resi-
dential property, the Minnesota Supreme Court elaborated in dicta on
the unjust restraint on alienation of borrower-occupied residential prop-
erty when due-on-sale clauses are used for purposes other than to protect
the lender's security interest.78 The court held that the economic con-
cerns and the need for quick and easy transfers of investment residential
property, where agreements are usually negotiated by experienced busi-
ness people, is not nearly as compelling as that of borrower-occupied resi-
dential property. 79 The court therefore permitted the enforcement of the
due-on-sale clause in Holiday Acres, allowing the mortgagee to require
refinancing of the investment loan.80 Even though borrower-occupied
residential property was not at issue in the case, the Minnesota Supreme
Court strongly stated in dicta that enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in
the transfer of borrower-occupied residential property is "per se unreason-
able except to protect against impairment of the lender's security
interest."81
2. de la Cuesta
Soon after Holiday Acres, the California Court of Appeals concurred
with the Minnesota court's Holday Acres holding regarding preemption
in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta.82 The Califor-
nia court held that the 1976 Regulations permitting the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses did not preempt a California statute limiting the en-
forcement of due-on-sale clauses.83
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court framed the issue as
whether the Bank Board intended to preempt California's law on due-
on-sale clauses, and if so, whether that action was within the scope of the
Bank Board's delegated authority.8 4 The Court held that the Bank
75. Hohday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 481.
76. Id
77. Id at 481.




82. 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 141
(1982).
83. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 341, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
84. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982). Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, when Congress directs an administrator to exercise discre-
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Board had the power to preempt state law because "federal regulations
have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes."85 Justice Blackmun
set forth a new test to be applied to the issue of preemption of state law
by federal regulation.8 6 This test examines the administrative agency's
intent and whether the agency exceeded its congressional grant of au-
thority or acted arbitrarily.
8 7
Applying this test, the Court held that the Bank Board's intent to pre-
empt state law was unambiguous.88 Upon examination of the legislative
history underlying the Bank Board's creation, the Court held that there
was congressional intent to grant the Bank Board preemptive power
based on the statutory definition of the Bank Board's powers.8 9 In light
of the legislative language, the Court stated, it would be difficult to im-
agine a statute granting greater administrative control.90
In de la Cuesta the Supreme Court voiced its concern for federal lenders
and their financial problems resulting from holding long-term mortgages
at low interest rates during a time of high inflation and high market
interest rates.9' The Court held that savings and loans will be able to
exercise due-on-sale clauses forcing refinancing at current interest rates.
92
Lending associations will thereby be able to alleviate their financial
problems and to continue to fund loans for new residential home
buyers.93
The opinion in de la Cuesta, therefore, prohibits state restrictions on the
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses for loans originating from federally-
tion in carrying out his duties, the scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of
whether he exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961).
85. 458 U.S. at 153.
86. d at 153-54.
87. Id at 153; see Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 (1982) (interpretation by an
agency charged with administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference); Ridg-
way v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 57 (1981) (regulations must not be "unreasonable, unau-
thorized, or inconsistent with the underlying statute"); see also Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383
(the administrator's choice should not be disturbed unless it appears from the statute or its
legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have
sanctioned).
88. 458 U.S. at 157-59. The Court based its position on Title 12 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, § 545.8-3() (1982) which states that a federal savings and loan associa-
tion continues to have the power "to include, and enforce, at its option, a due-on-sale
clause." See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
89. 458 U.S. at 160. The language cited by the Court states:
[Tihe Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe,
to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation and regu-
lation of associations to be known as 'Federal Savings and Loan Associations.'
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1) (1976).
90. 458 U.S. at 161; set a/so Glendale, 459 F. Supp. at 910 ("It would have been diffi-
cult for Congress to give the Bank Board a broader mandate").
91. See 458 U.S. at 168-69.
92. Id at 169-70.
93. Id at 168-69.
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chartered savings and loan associations.94 The decision criticized the
Minnesota court's holding in Holiday Acres with respect to the federal pre-
emption issue. 95 Since de la Cuesta applies only to mortgages originating
from federally-chartered savings and loans, the decision produced more
confusion in the mortgage market regarding mortgages originating from
state savings and loan associations.96
III. THE GARN ACT
A. Legislative History
In the wake of de la Cuesta, both the Senate and House Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs Committees began to consider legislation to ad-
dress the problems and questions arising from the enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses97 and the incidence of state restrictions on a nationwide
scale.98 The Senate Committee found "compelling" reasons for enacting
legislation to deal with state restrictions. 99 The Committee noted that
the state restrictions placed existing home buyers in an advantageous po-
sition at the expense of new home purchasers because new home buyers
paid for the due-on-sale restrictions in one of two ways. 0o The new
94. In a dissenting opinion, however, Justice Rehnquist stated that it was unconstitu-
tional to allow the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses merely for economic reasons. Id. at
175 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the promulgation of the
1976 Regulations exceeded the Bank Board's authority granted by Congress and that the
Bank Board departed from the administrative approach contemplated by Congress. Id. at
173-74. The dissent relied on section 8 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, 12
U.S.C. § 1428 (1976). 458 U.S. at 173.
The administrative approach envisioned by Congress did not include direct preemp-
tion. Rather, the HOLA was designed to allow the Bank Board to limit the operation of
the federal savings and loan system in states with unsatisfactory laws until economically
sound laws were enacted by the state legislatures. Id. at 175. The dissent stated that
contract and property law are the traditional domain of state law and "[d]ischarge of its
(the HOLA's) mission to ensure the soundness of federal savings and loans does not au-
thorize the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to intrude into the domain of state property
and contract law that Congress has left to the States." Id at 177.
95. Justice Blackmun made several specific references to Holiday Acres. See, e.g., 458
U.S. at 151 n.9, 170 n.23.
96. See 128 CONG. REc. H2451-74 (daily ed. May 20, 1982) (statement of Rep. Wylie)
("Most people, I might say, do not distinguish between a savings and loan and a bank.").
97. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (text of FMMA/FHLMC standard due-
on-sale clause).
98. S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3054, 3067-79 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
99. Id. at 3074; see also 128 CONG. REC. H2451-74 (daily ed. May 20, 1982) (statement
of Rep. St. Germain) (Garn Act intended to "revitalize the housing industry by strength-
ening the financial stability of home mortgage lending and insuring the availability of
home mortgage loans").
100. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3074-75. The committee noted that new home
buyers are placed at a disadvantage. While it is true this result might occur, it is unclear
why the committee made a distinction between buyers of existing homes and buyers of
new homes, as these disadvantages would apply to all home buyers. Presumably, the com-
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home purchaser either paid the existing homeowner an inflated price for
the property because of the attractive financing available at a below-
market interest rate on an assumable mortgage' 0 t or paid a premium for
a new loan written at market rates for a new home or an existing home
without an assumable mortgage. 102
The Senate Committee found that in the first instance the disadvan-
tage to the buyer resulted from the seller's desire to either recover losses
arising if he took back a second mortgage at below-market interest rates
or to reflect the great value of assuming a low interest loan.10 3 In the
second situation, the Committee reasoned that the lender was forced to
charge a premium for the new loan to offset the loss of earnings and the
greater risk caused by older mortgages that could not be refinanced be-
cause the due-on-sale clauses were unenforceable.10 4 The Senate Com-
mittee determined that state restrictions on due-on-sale clauses
encouraged "risky lending practices."105 These risky practices, such as
contracts for deed, do not include the historical equity of redemption
grace period; they thus increase the possibility of default.106
The Senate Committee noted that due-on-sale clauses needed to be
enforced to increase the lender's yield on mortgage portfolios.10 7 The
due-on-sale restrictions which allowed the assumption of existing mort-
gages continued the lives of older, low-interest mortgages. State restric-
tions would, therefore, eventually threaten the future availability of long-
mittee meant first-time home buyers or buyers new to the market who did not own a home
at the time of entry. See TASK FORCE ON DUE-ON-SALE, FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK
BD., FINAL REPORT AND TECHNICAL PAPERS ON THE TASK FORCE ON DUE-ON-SALE at
9 (March, 1982) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
101. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3074; TASK FORCE, supra note 100, at 19.
The author of the task force report set forth the proposition that the lender loses income
by not being able to reloan the principal at market rates. See id. at 3. This lost income is
recouped by the home buyer who assumes the loan at below market interest rates. See id
at 3-4. The buyer then compensates the seller for this income with a higher selling price.
See id. at 4.
102. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3074.
103. See id This conclusion is based on the fact that an older mortgage is "difficult to
assume because assumption requires a much larger initial payment by the prospective
buyer, or a large second mortgage or take back by the seller." Id.
104. See id at 3074-75.
105. Id at 3075. "Due-on-sale restrictions also encourage risky lending practices,
outside the realm of the traditional mortgage credit delivery system, which intensify de-
fault risks." Id
106. See id; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 100, at 11-12. Creative financing, such as a
contract for deed, usually involves junior mortgage loans and balloon payments. Id at 11.
These short-term loans and balloon payments often resulted in default during the Depres-
sion because inflation deteriorated the ability of the borrower to meet his payments. To-
day, the borrower on such financing instruments gambles that interest rates will drop so
that he will be able to refinance with a traditional lending instrument. Id. at 12.
107. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3075.
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term, fixed-rate mortgages. 0 8 This type of mortgage, the Senate Com-
mittee noted, was the "traditional mainstay of American
homeowners." 109
The Senate Committee based its conclusion regarding the state restric-
tions' effects on fixed-term mortgages in a study conducted by the Due-
On-Sale Task Force (Task Force) which was assembled by the Bank
Board."10 In its study, the Task Force predicted that by 1984, state re-
strictions on enforcement of due-on-sale provisions would create annual
losses of six to eight hundred million dollars for federal savings and
loans, III and annual losses exceeding one billion dollars for all federal
and state savings and loan associations.1 2 In addition, the Task Force
estimated an increase of fifteen to seventeen percent in the number of
associations that would need federal assistance by the end of 1983 if the
enforcement restrictions extended nationwide."
13
The Senate Committee also noted the detrimental effect of the unen-
forceability of due-on-sale clauses on the secondary mortgage market.'
4
The secondary mortgage market has traditionally relied on a standard,
uniform mortgage instrument. 115 Uniformity provided the secondary
mortgage market investor with the assurance of consistency in mortgages
originating from diverse sources.' 16 Investors could assess the risks and
rates of return in a prudent manner with a standard mortgage docu-
108. Id
109. Id
110. See TASK FORCE, supra note 100.
111. Id. at 2, 18; see SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3075; see also 128 CONG. REc.
S12213-16 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. Riegle) ("More than 1,000 savings
and loan associations-one-fourth of all the savings and loan associations in the country-
have insufficient net worth to survive the next 2 years at their current loss rate").
112. 128 CONG. REC. S12213 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen. Riegle).
These projected losses were based on two possible interest rate conditions over the two-
year period from 1982 to 1984. TASK FORCE, supra note 100, at 18-22. Both conditions
assumed mortgage interest rates would drop slightly over that two-year period with the
lower loss figure based on an interest rate decrease to fourteen percent, the higher loss
figure based on an interest rate decrease to sixteen percent. Id
113. TASK FORCE, supra note 100, at 26.
114. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3075; see also Note, The Due-On-Clause. A Pre-
emption Controversy, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 629, 638-39 (1977) (unless due-on-sale clauses are
enforced, loans will become less marketable in the secondary market).
115. Shontell, Schoepke & Cassidy, Eects of State Due-on-Sale Restritions on the Secondary
Mortgage Market, TASK FORCE, supra note 100, at 4.1-4.2.
116. Id These authors noted that:
When each mortgage of a pool of mortgages has the same features, the pool is
homogeneous; that is, investors can assess the pool as a single entity, without
concern for its component parts. This uniformity is the foundation of the con-
ventional secondary mortgage market because it provides an independent third
party, the investor, with the assurance of consistency in the mortgages originated
from diverse sources. Given a set of standard information, investors are able to
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ment. 117 The state due-on-sale restrictions, however, removed the as-
sumption of uniformity, shifting a greater portion of the interest rate risk
onto the investor.1 18 In response to state restrictions, investors in the sec-
ondary mortgage market hesitated to invest in mortgages which
originated in states restricting the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.' 19
The Senate Committee found that because the narrow holding in de la
Cuesla120 applied only to federal associations, state-chartered savings and
loans and other lenders were placed at a significant disadvantage. 21 De
la Cuesta also left the average consumer more confused and uncertain as
to the enforceability of due-on-sale provisions. 122 Therefore, the Senate
Committee determined that "[t]he pre-emption of state due-on-sale re-
strictions will place all lenders on a more competitive footing, and elimi-
nate the confusion surrounding enforceability of due-on-sale."123
Although Congress intended to rectify the confusion caused by de la
Cuesta, the Garn Act 124 created additional confusion for the consumer,
investors in the secondary mortgage market, and lending institutions.
The Garn Act's remedy for the problems facing the lending industry did
not attempt to balance these existing hardships between lenders and bor-
rowers. Rather, the Act preempts most state restrictions and allows lend-
ers to enforce the due-on-sale clause subject to some minor, limited
exceptions.
B. The Act
The Garn Act sets forth a blanket authorization for the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses by all mortgage lenders. The Garn Act thus
preempts state constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions which re-
strict the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses with certain exceptions.1
2 5
117. Id.
118. Id. Non-uniformity will result in greater risks and "discounts on mortgage-backed
securities and a reallocation of funds away from the housing industry to more stable, uni-
form sources of investment." Id.
119. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3075. The Committee noted that state
restrictions have caused the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal
National Mortgage Corporation to change their investment practices in several states. Id
120. See id
121. Id; Comment, Due-On-Sale Clauses After Passage of the Cam Act- More Questions Than
Answers?. 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897, 898 (1983) According to this Comment, lenders
unaffected by de la Cuesta were at a disadvantage because they could not enforce the clause
and update their portfolios. Lenders affected by de la Cuesta had only an "illusory advan-
tage" because buyers preferred not to deal with lenders who could enforce the clause. Id.
122. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3075.
123. Id.
124. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3 (West Supp. 1983).
125. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3 (West Supp. 1983). This section provides:
In the case of a contract involving a real property loan which was made or as-
sumed . . .during the period beginning on the date a state adopted a constitu-
tional provision or Statute prohibiting the exercise of due-on-sale clauses, or the
date on which the highest court of such State has rendered a decision . . .
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Section 1701j-3 of the Garn Act addresses the preemption issue raised in
de la Cuesta and Holiday Acres with a direct statement of congressional
intent to preempt state law.126 The congressional power underlying the
Act was based on the commerce clause127 and the rationale that real
estate financing and due-on-sale clauses affect interstate commerce.128
The broad scope of the Garn Act's preemption provision is subject to
very few limitations.129 It applies to all lenders, including state- and fed-
erally-chartered institutions, private institutions, individuals, o3 0 and gov-
ernmental agencies such as the FHA and VA.'31
The Garn Act does not expressly state whether it covers contracts for
deed.' 3 2 Nevertheless, the broad definition of "lender,"' 13 3 coupled with
an equally broad definition of "real property loan,"' 3 4 could bring con-
tracts for deed under the auspices of the Act. 135 The definition of real
property loan includes a "credit sale secured by a lien on real prop-
erty."1 36 The Garn Act's apparent treatment of contracts for deed as
mortgages does not signal a notable change in Minnesota law since prior
Minnesota case law suggests that contracts for deed constitute liens or
prohibiting such exercise, and ending on the date of the enactment of this section
[Oct. 15, 1982], the provisions of subsection (b) shall apply only in the case of a
transfer which occurs on or after the expiration of 3 years after the date of enact-
ment of this Act ....
Id
The seminal provision appears in § 1701j-3(b)(1). This section provides: "Notwith-
standing any provision of the constitution or laws (including the judicial decisions) of any
State to the contrary, a lender may . . . enter into or enforce a contract containing a due-
on-sale clause with respect to a real property loan." Id.
126. See Barad & Layden, Due on Sale Law as Preempted by the Garn-St. Germain Act, 12
REAL EST. L.J. 138, 140 (1983); Wertheim, Due-On-Sale II. The New Federal Preemption, I
MINN. REAL EST. L.J. 113 (1982).
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
128. See Wertheim, supra note 126, at 113 (due-on-sale clauses particularly affect com-
merce in the sale of mortgages in the secondary mortgage market); see also Sanders, Con-
gress legislates on "due-on-sale" mortgage clauses, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1983, at 53, 54. Sanders noted
that in addition to the secondary mortgage market consideration, the increased mobility
of the American home buying population brings mortgages under the commerce clause.
Id at 54-55.
129. See Rom, The Garn Bill and Due-On-Sale Clauses in Minesota, HENNEPIN LAW., Jan.-
Feb. 1983, at 8.
130. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983); see Rom, supra note 129, at 8.
131. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(a)(2). Under this section a lender is defined as "a per-
son or government agency making a real property loan or any assignee or transferee, in
whole or in part, of such person or agency." Id This broad definition is intended to
encompass private individuals, private institutions, government lenders such as the FHA
and VA, and the secondary mortgage market.
132. Rom, supra note 129, at 8.
133. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
134. See id § 1701j-3(a)(3).
135. See Wertheim, supra note 126, at 113.
136. § 1701j-3(a)(3); see Wertheim, Due-On-Sale Clauses in Minnesota, I MINN. REAL
EST. L.J. 33, 39 (1982).
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The Garn Act's definition of a due-on-sale clause is also very inclusive,
providing:
[T]he term 'due-on-sale clause' means a contract provision which au-
thorizes a lender, at its option, to declare due and payable sums se-
cured by the lender's security instrument if all or any part of the
property, or any interest therein, securing the real property loan is sold
or transferred without the lender's prior written consent. 138
This statutory language does not, however, require any notice of interest
rate adjustments139 as the FNMA/FHLMC's uniform mortgage instru-
ment demands.140 Congress limited this definition by stating that the
lender's right to exercise the due-on-sale clause is governed exclusively by
the instrument.141 Thus, if the mortgage clause merely requires the
lender's consent, without referring specifically to a right of acceleration,
the due-on-sale definition probably will not imply such a provision.142
The Garn Act sets forth nine conditions under which a due-on-sale
clause cannot be enforced.14 3 These provisions apply to all loans, includ-
137. Nichols v. L & 0, Inc., 293 Minn. 17, 196 N.W.2d 465 (1972) (relationship of
vendor and vendee is analogous to that of mortgagor and mortgagee); State ex rel. Blee v.
City of Rochester, 260 Minn. 151, 109 N.W.2d 44 (1961) (vendor in contract for deed
occupies a position substantially analogous to that of mortgagee); In re S.R.A., Inc., 219
Minn. 493, 18 N.W.2d 442 (1945), affd, 327 U.S. 558 (1946) (difference between security
right obtained under mortgage and that provided by executory sales contract is a matter
of form only); First & Am. Nat'l Bank of Duluth v. Whiteside, 207 Minn. 537, 292 N.W.
770 (1940) (relationship between vendor and vendee was similar to that created by a mort-
gage); Summers v. Midland Co., 167 Minn. 453, 209 N.W. 323 (1926) (contract vendor
holds legal title merely as security for payment of purchase price, therefore his interest is a
lien). But see Nelson & Whitman, The Installment Land Contract.- A National Vtewpot7, 1977
B.Y.U.L. REV. 541. These commentators suggest that it is socially advantageous for the
law to provide a quick and inexpensive way for the vendor to terminate because it encour-
ages the extension of credit to people whose credit is so poor they would not otherwise be
able to purchase a home. Id. at 561. The authors also indicate that judicial conversion of
a contract for deed into a mortgage in order to provide an equity of redemption may force
the vendor to litigate. This is the result the vendor hoped to avoid by using a contract for
deed. Id.,- see also Hetland, The California Land Contract, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 729, 773-74
(1960) (increase of vendee's rights, including judicial conversion of a contract for deed into
a mortgage, made contract for deed legally obsolete in California).
138. § 1701j-3(a)(l).
139. Sanders, supra note 128, at 53.
140. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
141. See § 1701j-3(b)(2); see also McGuire, The Due-On-Sale Controversy. Restraints on Ahen-
ation and Federal Regulation of Real Estate Mortgages After de la Cuesta and the Garn-St. Germain
Act, 1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 487. McGuire notes that because all rights and remedies of the
lender and borrower are fixed and governed by the contract, this language suggests that a
borrower may not invoke the equitable defenses of laches, waiver, estoppel, and uncon-
scionability. Id. at 525.
142. Sanders, supra note 128, at 53; see Young, 624 P.2d at 237 (court concluded it would
be improper to imply a due-on-sale clause where none existed).
143. § 1701j-3(d). This section provides:
[A] lender may not exercise its option pursuant to a due-on-sale clause upon-
19851
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ing window period loans,144 and all lenders, including federal savings
and loan institutions.145 The nine conditions include the four exceptions
listed in the federal regulations promulgated by the Bank Board in
1976146 and found in Paragraph 17 of the uniform FNMA/FHLMC
standard mortgage instrument.14 7 The other exceptions relate to family
transfers or transfers used in estate planning.148 These exceptions are not
intended to "facilitate financing arrangements which are designed to cir-
cumvent the legitimate right of a lender to enforce a due-on-sale clause,
rather, [they are intended] to provide protections for consumers by
prohibiting the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses where such enforce-
ment would be inequitable."1
49
C Window Pertiod Exception
In addition to the nine exceptions, the window period provides the
most noteworthy exception to the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.150
The Act defines a window period loan as one:
which was made or assumed, including a transfer of the liened property
subject to the real property loan, during the period beginning on the
date a State adopted a constitutional provision or statute prohibiting
the exercise of due-on-sale clauses, or the date on which the highest
court of such State has rendered a decision . . . prohibiting such exer-
cise, and ending on October 15, 1982 [date of enactment of this
(1) the creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the lender's secur-
ity instrument which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the
property;
(2) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances;
(3) a transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint
tenant or tenant by the entirety;
(4) the granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an
option to purchase;
(5) a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower;
(6) a transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become an owner of
the property;
(7) a transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, legal separa-
tion agreement, or from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which
the spouse of the borrower becomes an owner of the property;
(8) a transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and remains a
beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the
property; or
(9) any other transfer or disposition described in regulations prescribed by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Id
144. Wertheim, supra note 126, at 116.
145. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3067-79 (neither state nor federal regulatory
agencies may override these exceptions).
146. See 12 C.F.R. § 545.34 (1984) (due-on-sale clauses subject to the provisions of the
Garn Act).
147. See supra note 50 (text of Paragraph 17) and accompanying text.
148. Wertheim, supra note 126, at 116.
149. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3079.
150. § 1701j-3(c)(1)(A) and (B).
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A window period mortgage is one that was originated or assumed during
the period when state law restricted due-on-sale enforcement. The win-
dow period can be triggered by a state statute, constitutional provision,
or judicial decision.152 A state which did not restrict enforcement of due-
on-sale clauses prior to the enactment of the Garn Act does not have a
window period. 153 The legislative history underlying the window period
exception indicates that the period is primarily transitional and designed
to avoid inequity for those home buyers "who, despite the contractual
terms of their mortgage contracts, relied on state due-on-sale restrictions
and reasonably believed they had assumable loans."154
The mere existence of a window period loan depends on the lender
originating the loan.155 The Garn Act incorporates the de la Cuesta deci-
sion156 by stating that due-on-sale enforcement for federally-chartered
savings and loans is subject to the Bank Board's exclusive authority.1
57
Therefore, the window period exception does not apply to loans
originated by federally-chartered savings and loans.158 Only loans
originated by non-federally-chartered lenders are eligible for treatment
as window period loans. To cover situations in which a state-chartered
lender converts to a federally-chartered institution, Congress provided
that the identity of the mortgagee at the time the loan originated deter-
mines whether a loan falls within the window period exception. 159
Loans eligible for treatment as window period loans will be subject to
applicable state restrictions only from October 15, 1982 to October 15,
1985,160 unless a state legislature acts within this three-year period to
pass legislation regarding window period loans.16, The three-year transi-
tion period allows state legislatures to review the impact of the due-on-
sale restrictions, to weigh the rights of consumers who have window pe-
riod mortgages or who are trying to assume such a loan, and to adopt a
different approach to window period loans if they choose.162 For exam-
ple, a state legislature may repeal the restrictions on the enforcement of
window period due-on-sale clauses, lengthen the time due-on-sale restric-
tions apply-presumably for the life of the loan, or authorize or mandate
151. Id
152. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3076.
153. Id at 3077.
154. Id at 3076.
155. Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 144.
156. See de la Cuesta, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
157. Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 146.
158. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3076; Wertheim, supra note 126, at 116.
159. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3078.
160. 12 C.F.R. § 591.4(c) (1984); Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 144.
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the use of blended-interest rates. 163
If state legislatures made window period loans permanently transfera-
ble, this might contravene the preemption rule set forth in section
341(b)(1) and "take back from the lenders that which the Act sought to
give."1 64 While states have the power to enact laws dealing with window
period loans, they may not expand the type of loan governed by a win-
dow period.' 6 5 If states take no action by October 14, 1985, federal pre-
emption becomes effective and the due-on-sale clauses in window period
loans will be enforceable.1 66 In addition, lenders may call in the mort-
gage debt even in window period loans, where the buyer is unable to
meet the lenders' credit requirements.1
67
The Garn Act sought to end the confusion in the mortgage market
caused by state restrictions on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses, but
the window period exceptions, the ability of the states to expand these
exceptions, and the different treatment afforded federal and non-federal
institutions only create more confusion. The Garn Act preempts all state
statutes, common law, and constitutional provisions; yet at the same time
it recognizes these same state laws with respect to the window period
exception. The Garn Act specifically allows states to legislate on the win-
dow period exception, and thereby to occupy a part of the field of law
concerning due-on-sale clauses.
163. Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 144; see also Coleman, Federal Preempitn of State
Law Prohibitions on the Exercise of Due-On-Sale Clauses, 100 BANKING L.J. 772 (1983). Cole-
man noted that:
Although this language appears on its face to be merely a bit of gratuitous advice
to lenders to compromise with borrowers when negotiating the interest rate upon
the transfer of a loan, it is conceivable that at some point a borrower may chal-
lenge a given lender's right to exercise a due-on-sale clause on the basis of this
rather unusual statutory language.
Id at 779. For an example of a state complying with the Garn Act's encouragement, see
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-15C(2)-(3) (1983) (legislation authorizing a blended rate for win-
dow period loans until Oct. 15, 1982).
Blended rate interest is defined as "an interest rate between the lower contract rate
and the higher market rate for newly originated loans." SENATE REPORT, supra note 98,
at 3075.
164. Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 144.
165. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3077. The report provides that "state legisla-
tures may not expand the types of loans to which the window period applies-e.g. a state
which presently restricts due-on-sale enforcement for single family loans. . . but not mul-
tifamily loans could not expand that restriction to multifamily loans." Id
166. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3077 ("[i]f a state takes no action during the
three year period the federal preemption would become effective thereafter and due-on-
sale clauses in window period loans would be enforceable"). See Barad & Layden, supra
note 126, at 144.
167. Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 145; see 12 C.F.R. § 591.4(d) (1984) (rules
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D. The Act's Effect on Mtnnesota
The Senate Committee noted that four states had statutes restricting
the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses168 and that "Georgia and Minne-
sota also have adopted laws on the subject, but it is unclear from reading
them just what restrictions, if any, they impose on the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses. The highest courts in those states could be the final
arbiter of the impact of those laws."169 One commentator found this
language "puzzling" in light of the clear restrictions in Minnesota Stat-
utes section 47.20, subdivision 6.170 Nevertheless, subdivision 6 was
amended in 1977,171 1979,172 and 1981,173 thus possibly creating three
window periods. Minnesota Statutes section 47.20, subdivisions 6 and
6a,174 is the only Minnesota statute applicable to due-on-sale clauses.
The statute applies to certain loans of less than $100,000 made to non-
corporate borrowers purchasing one to four unit residential property for
use as the borrower's primary residence.175 Subdivisions 6 and 6a apply
to all lenders with the exceptions of federally-chartered savings and loan
associations and national banks in mortgage transactions involving ad-
justable interest rates. 176 These two subdivisions do not apply to FHA
and VA loans.
177
The exact boundaries of the window period in Minnesota are uncer-
tain. Since state statutes are one of the forms of state action that can
trigger a window period, 178 one possibility is on or after April 1, 1976,
when the legislature amended Minnesota Statutes section 47.20, subdivi-
sion 6.179 This amendment limited the assumption fee for loans originat-
ing on or after April 1, 1976.180 The limit on the assumption fee could
restrict the exercise of a due-on-sale clause if the "assumption fee" lan-
168. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3076 n.2. The four states listed by the Senate
Committee were Colorado, Iowa, New Mexico, and Utah. Id.
169. Id
170. Wertheim, supra note 126, at 114.
171. Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 350, 1977 Minn. Laws 745, 749 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 47.20 (1982)).
172. Act of Apr. 30, 1979, ch. 48, 1979 Minn. Laws 62, 63-64 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 47.20 (1982)).
173. Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 137, 1981 Minn. Laws 420, 428-29 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 47.20, subds. 6, 6a (1982)). This amendment added subdivision 6a. Id
174. MINN. STAT. § 47.20, subd. 6a (1982).
175. Id § 47.20, subd. 2(3) (1983) (defining "conventional loan" as used in subdivisions
6 and 6a); Id § 47.20, subds. 6, 6a; Rom, supra note 129, at 9.
176. § 47.20, subd. 6a.
177. Id § 47.20, subd. 2(3) (defining "conventional loan" as used in subdivisions 6 and
6a while excluding FHA and VA loans).
178. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3076.
179. Act of Apr. 13, 1976, ch. 300, 1976 Minn. Laws 1117, 1121 (amending MINN.
STAT. § 47.20, subd. 6 (1982)).
180. § 47.20, subd. 6.
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guage were given a broad interpretation. 18 Since due-on-sale enforce-
ment usually results in the buyer assuming the mortgage at a market
interest rate, this increased interest rate could be construed as an "as-
sumption fee." A more narrow reading would be that the 1976 amend-
ment only restricts the assumption fee.18 2 In any event, there is
confusion as to whether this 1976 amendment creates a window period in
Minnesota from April 1, 1976 to May 31, 1979.
Another window period may have been created by the 1979 amend-
ment to Minnesota Statutes section 47.20, subdivision 6 which covers
purchase money, residential, and conventional mortgages made between
June 1, 1979 and May 8, 1981.183 The statute requires that a mortgagee
must consent to the transfer of the property as long as the seller continues
to be obliged for the indebtedness. 184 The lender cannot increase the
interest rates nor inquire into the creditworthiness of the purchaser. 185
Another window period may have been judicially created by the Min-
nesota Supreme Court in its Hohday Acres decision. In Holiday Acres, the
Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted, in dictum, section 47.20, subdivi-
sion 6.186 The court stated that the legislature, by enacting the section,
had in effect determined that the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in
the sale of owner-occupied residential property was unreasonable per se
unless enforcement was necessary to protect the lender's security inter-
est.18 7 Since the Garn Act's legislative history states that the definition of
the window period is left to state statutes, constitutional provisions, or
judicial decisions of the highest court in the state,188 subdivision 6 thus creates a
window period for mortgages qualifying under the statute that
originated on or after June 1, 1979 and on or before May 8, 1981.189
Thus, these mortgages will have restricted due-on-sale clauses until Octo-
ber 15, 1985, unless the Minnesota Legislature enacts further legislation
in this area.' 9o
Subdivision 6a, added in 1981, governs mortgages coming under the
181. Wertheim, supra note 126, at 114-15 n. 11. Wertheim argued that a limitation on
an assumption fee also operates to limit the exercise of a due-on-sale clause. Id
182. Id. Wertheim stated that if limited to restricting assumption fees, this amendment
will create a window period governing assumption fees. Id
183. § 47.20, subd. 6; see also Wertheim, supra note 126, at 114.
184. § 47.20, subd. 6; Rom, supra note 129, at 9.
185. § 47.20, subd. 6; Rom, supra note 129, at 9.
186. 308 N.W.2d 471, 484 (Minn. 1981).
187. Id.
188. SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3076.
189. Rom, supra note 129, at 9; see Wertheim, supra note 126, at 114 (section 47.20,
subd. 6 appears to prohibit exercise of due-on-sale clauses in purchase money residential
conventional mortgages made between June 1, 1979 and May 8, 1981).
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statute which were entered on or after May 9, 1981.191 Subdivision 6a
requires the lender to consent to the buyer's assumption and to release
the seller from liability if the buyer is creditworthy and agrees to assume
the obligations from the seller and to the increase of the interest rate.192
Confusion surrounds the effect of the Garn Act on this amendment.
While there is no prohibitory language in the statute, one commentator
has concluded that it prohibits the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in
conventional loans. 19 3 Another has stated that the Act essentially makes
due-on-sale clauses fully enforceable.194
Thus, out of three Minnesota statutes which could possibly create a
window period, the 1976 and the 1981 amendments do not clearly create
such a period and the 1979 amendment would be in a similar situation if
the Holiday Acres court had not addressed the amendment in its decision.
Determining whether Minnesota has statutorily created window periods
is much less confusing, however, than determining whether Minnesota
has a judicially created window period.
There is no Minnesota Supreme Court decision dealing with the en-
forceability of due-on-sale clauses prior to the Hohday Acres195 decision of
April 3, 1981. In HohdayAcres, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that
"the Legislature, by enacting Minn. Stat. § 47.20, subd. 6.. . has deter-
mined, in effect, that the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in the trans-
fer of borrower-occupied residential property, as limited by the statute is
per se unreasonable except to protect against impairment of the lender's
security interest." 196 In determining whether Holiday Acres creates a win-
dow period, it is important to note that the court's language is dictum.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, in Gate Co. v. Aidwest Federal
191. Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 137, 1981 Minn. Laws 420, 428-29 (codified as amended
at MINN. STAT. § 47.20, subd. 6a (1982)).
192. Id. Subdivision 6a provides in part:
The lender may charge a fee not in excess of one-tenth of one percent of the
remaining unpaid principal balance in the event the loan or advance of credit is
assumed by the transferee and the existing borrower continues after the transfer
to be obligated for repayment of the entire assumed indebtedness. A lender may
charge a fee not in excess of one percent of the remaining unpaid principal bal-
ance in the event the remaining indebtedness is assumed by the transferee and
the existing borrower is released from all obligations under the loan instruments.
Id
193. Rom, supra note 129, at 9. Rom states:
[T]here undoubtedly will be some disagreement as to [subdivision 6a's] effect
under the Garn Bill. The most likely interpretation will be that since the statute
essentially prohibits the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in conventional
loans, the Garn Bill would not preempt conventional loans made on or after
May 9, 1981, which are transferred prior to October 15, 1985, and they are
assumable.
Id
194. Wertheim, supra note 126, at 114-15 (probable effect is to make due-on-sale
clauses in residential mortgages entered into after May 8, 1981 fully enforceable).
195. 308 N.W.2d 471.
196. Id. at 484.
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Savings & Loan Association,19 7 referred to the language in Holiday Acres as a
holding, not dictum. 198 In Hoeg v. Twin City Federal Savings & Loan Associ-
ation'99 the court stated, "The trial court, relying on our decision in Holi-
day Acres . . . properly concluded that the due on sale clause was
unenforceable." 20 0 One commentator has stated that the dicta in Hohday
Acres, Gate, and Hoeg is "weak-it does not purport to be a decision of the
court, but only a characterization of Minnesota Statute[s] [section] 47.20,
subd. 6 or 6a.'"201
Even if Hol'day Acres is interpreted to create a window period, some
mortgages on residential owner-occupied property will be subject to stat-
utory regulation. Residential mortgages made on or after April 3 to May
8, 1981 will be subject to the window period created by Minnesota Stat-
utes section 47.20, subdivision 6. In addition, most residential mortgages
entered into on or after May 8, 1981 to October 15, 1982 will be subject
to subdivision 6a, 20 2 which may create a window period. The only post-
April 3, 1981 borrower-occupied mortgages which would definitely come
under a judicial window period are refinanced mortgages or mortgages
over $100,000, neither of which are subject to statutory regulation.20
3
Arguably, the Garn Act leaves the ultimate determination of a judicial
window period to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Armed with such
power, the court in Viereck v. Peoples Savings & Loan Association2° 4 elevated
its Holiday Acres dictum to the status of a holding.20 5
In Minnesota, the Garn Act created more confusion than it elimi-
nated. The window period exception is not easily discerned from vague
197. 324 N.W.2d 202 (Minn. 1982).
198. Id. at 205. The court stated:
The trial court, relying on our holding in Holiday Acres ... concluded that [the
lender] had no right to enforce the clause because Minnesota law prohibits the
exercise of such clauses in mortgages covering owner-occupied residential prop-
erty. In Holtday Acres, we noted that under Minnesota Law the enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses in the transfer of borrow-occupied residential property is per
se unreasonable unless done to protect the lender from the impairment of its
security interest.
Id
199. 324 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1982).
200. Id. at 377. Gate Co. and Hoeg were decided on federal preemption grounds, not on
the direct issue of enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in mortgages to which the preemp-
tion is inapplicable. See Gate Co., 324 N.W.2d at 205-07; Hoeg, 324 N.W.2d at 377-78;
Rom, supra note 129, at 10.
201. Rom, supra note 129, at 10. Rom argues that the court's "characterization of the
statute is clearly in error, since there are many mortgages of owner-occupied property not
covered by the statute." Id
202. MINN. STAT. § 47.20, subd. (6)(a) (1982).
203. See id. Since Hohday Acres was decided on April 3, 1981, it can create a judiciary
window period only for mortgages covered after that date and those that do not meet the
statutory requirements of origination and a principal amount of less than $100,000. See
Rom, supra note 129, at 9.
204. 343 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1984).
205. See itfia note 286 and accompanying text.
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state statutes and judicial dicta. To clarify the Garn Act and its impact
on state law, the Bank Board promulgated regulations on May 13, 1983
which take a firmer pro-lender stance than the Garn Act.2 0 6
IV. THE 1983 REGULATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON MINNESOTA
MORTGAGES
On May 13, 1983, the Bank Board promulgated its final regulations
governing the implementation of the Garn Act in an attempt to clarify
problems created by the Act.207 These regulations (1983 Regulations)
restate and clarify some statutory provisions of the Garn Act.2 0 8 Many
questions facing Minnesota practitioners after the Garn Act are ad-
dressed by the 1983 Regulations. 209 Indeed, some of the provisions seem
tailored to areas of Minnesota due-on-sale law left uncertain after enact-
ment of the Garn Act. 2 10 The 1983 Regulations, however, are over-
whelmingly pro-lender and were soon attacked by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Viereck v. Peoples Saving & Loan Associtzz'on.2 I1
The 1983 Regulations explicitly provide that the identity of the mort-
gage originator, rather than the holder, determines whether the loan is
subject to a window period.2 12 Therefore, only those mortgages originat-
ing from non-federal savings and loans are eligible for window period
protection.213
The 1983 Regulations modify the statutory scheme of the Garn Act by
206. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554-63 (1983) (amending 12 C.F.R. §§ 556.9, 590.2(g), 590.4(e),
adding part 591 (1984)).
207. Id.;see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(e)(l) (West Supp. 1983). This section provides:
"The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, in consultation with the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency and the National Credit Union Administration Board, is authorized to issue rules
and regulations and to publish interpretations governing the implementation of this sec-
tion." Id
208. See Wertheim, New Due-On-Sale Regulations, I MINN. REAL EST. L.J. 181 (1983).
209. See id.
210. Id. at 181.
211. 343 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1984).
212. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3078. The report provides:
The identity of the lender at the time the loan was originated determines
whether or not a loan is subject to window period restrictions. For example, a
loan originated by a state chartered savings and loan association which subse-
quently converted to a federally chartered thrift will be subject to state due-on-
sale restrictions for three years, unless state action provides other treatment for
such loans.
Id
213. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983); see Wertheim, supra note 208, at
182; Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 146; see also 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554, 21,562 (1983) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.3(b)). This regulation provides that the "exercise by any
lender of a due-on-sale clause in a loan originated by a Federal association shall be exclu-
sively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and remedies. . . shall at
all times be fixed and governed by that contract." Id.
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restricting the window period and other exemptions. 2 14 Only loans
made on owner-occupied homes are covered by a window period; loans
issued for commercial development, for example, are not covered.
2t 5
This pro-lender approach is followed with regard to "blended rates."
The statutory language merely encourages a lender to allow a consumer
to assume a blended rate mortgage;2 16 no lender, however, is obligated to
average the contract and market rates. 2 17 The 1983 Regulations stressed
a plain language reading of the Garn Act and imposed no mandatory
obligation on lenders to adopt a blended rate policy.
2 18
The 1983 Regulations address the issue whether contracts for deed
come within the scope of the Garn Act. While the Garn Act did not
specifically include contracts for deed in its definition of a loan secured
by a lien on real property, 2 19 the 1983 Regulations plainly expand the
definition of a loan to include contracts for deed.
220
The 1983 Regulations also address the issue whether a contract for
deed is a subordinate lien. The regulations indicate that the creation of a
vendee's or vendor's interest in a contract for deed is not included in the
window period exception. 22' The 1983 Regulations state that the win-
dow period exception applies "[plrovided [t]hat such lien or encum-
brance is not created pursuant to a contract for deed." 222 The Bank
Board added this language to close a loophole in the subordinate lien
exception for transfer of an equitable interest to a vendee by a contract
for deed. 223 The Bank Board took the liberty of adding language to the
Act because otherwise the loophole would have made the Act
214. 12 C.F.R. § 591.5 (1984).
215. Barad & Layden, supra note 126, at 149 (permitted transfers only apply to loans
made on owner-occupied homes; therefore, loans for construction and development would
not be covered by a window period).
216. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983). For a definition of "blended
rate" mortgage, see supra note 163 and accompanying text.
217. See Coleman, supra note 163, at 779-80 and accompanying text (the National As-
sociation of Realtors urged lenders and borrowers to compromise on a blended rate of
interest between contract and market rates upon transfers of unencumbered property).
218. Supplementary Information: Preemption-Other Lenders, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554,
21,558 (1983) (a lender has no mandatory obligation to offer blended rates); see 12
U.S.C.A. § 1701j-3(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
219. See Rom, supra note 129, at 8 (the Garn Act does not specify whether it applies to
contracts for deed); cf. Karem v. Werner, 333 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1983) (court enforced a
due-on-sale provision in an action to enjoin vendors from proceeding with a cancellation
of contract for deed, rendering the issue of whether the Garn Act applied to contracts for
deed moot). Id at 878 n. 1.
220. 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(h) (1984). This definition includes "a loan on the security of
any instrument (whether a mortgage, deed of trust, or land contract)." Id
221. Id. § 591.5(b) (1984).
222. Id. § 591.5(b)(1)(i) (1984); see Wertheim, supra note 208, at 183 (language exclud-
ing liens created pursuant to a contract for deed was added to avoid possible loopholes in
the transfer of an equitable interest to a vendee by a contract for deed).
223. See 12 C.F.R. § 591.5 (1984).
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This regulatory addition also answers the question whether the trans-
fer of a vendor's interest in a contract for deed creates a subordinate lien.
This issue was left unresolved by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Gate
Co.225 The comments to the final regulation indicate that the exception
does not apply to either a vendor's or a vendee's interest in a contract for
deed.226 This regulation is contrary to Minnesota law which classifies a
vendor's interest as a lien.227 In addition, it sets a trap for the unsophisti-
cated vendee who does not restrict the rights of his vendor to assign the
contract. 2
28
The protection afforded by a state statutory window period is further
restricted by the 1983 Regulations' definition of statutes which create
window periods.229 The 1983 Regulations set forth two specific catego-
ries of state statutes which can create window periods.230 To be eligible,
the statute must: (1) restrict the lender's right to enforce the due-on-sale
clause to instances in which the lender's security would be impaired; or
(2) restrict the lender's right to increase the interest rate on the trans-
fer.231 These categories are exclusive; statutes failing to fulfill one of
these criteria do not create window periods. 232 A statute providing that
the mortgagor has an extended period of redemption after a foreclosure
sale based on the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause falls outside these
categories and does not create a window period. 233 A statute which
merely limits the fees a lender may charge upon transfer also fails to
create a window period.
234
Under the 1983 Regulations, the current version of Minnesota Statutes
section 47.20, subdivision 6, which requires lender consent on residential
mortgage transfers made between June 1, 1979 to May 8, 1981,235 creates
a window period.236 However, a current version of that same statute
224. Id
225. See Gate Co., 324 N.W.2d at 205. Some courts previously facing the issue con-
cluded that a sale by contract for deed was not exempted. E.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Frontier Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 649 P.2d 536, 538 (Okla. 1982).
226. Wertheim, supra note 208, at 183-84; see 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(1)(i) (1984).
227. Wertheim, supra note 208, at 184; see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
228. Wertheim, supra note 208, at 184, citing Wertheim, Due-on-Sale Clauses in Mnnesota,
I MINN. REAL EST. L.J. 33, 40 (1982); Wertheim, Due-on-Sale Clauses-An Update, 1 MINN.
REAL EST. L.J. 81, 84-86 (1982).
229. Wertheim, supra note 208, at 182.
230. 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p)(3) (1984); 12 C.F.R. § 591.
2 (p)(2 )(i) (1984).
231. Wertheim, supra note 208, at 182 n.19.
232. Id at 182-83, citing 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554, 21,555-56 (1983).
233. 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554, 21,556 (1983).
234. Id
235. MINN. STAT. § 47.20, subd. 6 (1982).
236. See 12 C.F.R. § 591. 2 (p)(3) (1984); see also Wertheim, supra note 208, at 182-83.
Wertheim states that the 1983 Regulations restrict the categories of state laws that will
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which limited the assumption fees charged for residential home loans
made from April 1, 1976 to May 31, 1979237 would not create a window
period. 2
38
In addition to restricting the categories of state statutes that afford
window period protection, the 1983 Regulations took notice of some
state statutes that restricted enforcement of certain types of mortgages. 239
Under the Regulations, the 1983 window periods only create protection
for loans specifically addressed by state law.240 Minnesota's statutory
window period, therefore, applies only to loans of less than $100,000
secured by a mortgage on a one- to four-unit borrower-occupied
dwelling.241
While the Garn Act impliedly allows states to enact legislation to cre-
ate a statutory window period,242 the 1983 Regulations limit the actions
a state may take. The Senate Report suggested that states may repeal
the due-on-sale restrictions, extend the time the restrictions apply, or au-
thorize the use of a blended interest rate.243 The 1983 Regulations, how-
ever, only allow the states to either eliminate existing due-on-sale
restrictions or shorten the three-year transition period from October 15,
1982 to October 15, 1985.244
qualify under the Regulations. The categories are exclusive; if a state does not fall within
one of the categories, no window period will be created. See id.
237. § 47.20, subd. 6.
238. See Wertheim, supra note 208, at 182-83; see also supra note 236.
239. Wertheim, supra note 208, at 183.
240. See 12 C.F.R. § 591. 2 (p)(1) (1984). A window period loan under section 591.2
(p)(l) applies only to real property loans which were "made or assumed during a window-
period created by state law and subject to that law." Id
241. See § 47.20, subd. 6. Subdivision 6, the statute creating Minnesota's window pe-
riod, applies only to conventional loans for the purchase of any one to four family dwelling
that will be used as a borrower's primary.residence. Id A "conventional loan" is defined
as "a loan or advance of credit . . . to a noncorporate borrower in an original principal
amount of less than $100,000, secured by a mortgage upon real property containing one or
more residential units." § 47.20, subd. 2(3). Therefore, the window period applies only to
those loans of less than $100,000 that are secured by a mortgage on a one to four unit,
borrower-occupied dwelling.
242. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3077. Under the Garn Act, window period
loans originated by non-federally chartered lenders are subject to state law for three years,
unless the state acts within that time period to regulate these loans in a different fashion.
The three-year period, which began after the enactment of the Garn Act:
provide[d] State Legislatures . . . with the opportunity to review the impact
due-on-sale restrictions have imposed on non-federally chartered lenders, [to]
consider the rights of consumers who received assumable mortgages under state
laws or court decisions restricting due-on-sale enforcement, and to formulate an
alternative approach to window period loans if. . . desire[d].
Id.
243. Id.
244. Supplementary Information: Preemption-Other Lenders, 48 Fed. Reg. 21,554,
21,558 (1983). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has interpreted 12 C.F.R.
§ 591.4(c)(1)(A) (1984) to allow states to shorten the three-year transition period, or even
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The Federal Home Loan Bank Board interpretation of the 1983 Regu-
lations addresses the issue of judicially-created window periods.
245
Under the Board's interpretation, a state judicial decision creating win-
dow period protection must "include language expressly holding a due-
on-sale clause unenforceable, rather than merely commenting on unen-
forceability in dicta. "246 Minnesota, therefore, does not have a common
law window period, because the Holiday Acres language on the enforce-
ment of a due-on-sale clause is dictum. 247 Although the language in Gate
Co. appears to elevate the Holiday Acres language to a holding,2 48 the orig-
inal language of Holiday Acres and Gate Co. is dictum.249 Thus, neither
case creates a judicial window period.
By interpreting the Garn Act in a pro-lender manner, the 1983 Regu-
lations further erode the power of consumer mortgagors which was al-
ready limited by de la Cuesta and the Garn Act. One commentator has
argued that the 1983 Regulations are "vulnerable to judicial chal-
lenge."250 Another, however, has pointed out that a challenge to the
1983 Regulations would not be promising given the deference shown to
the previous due-on-sale regulations by the United States Supreme Court
in de la Cuesta.25 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided Viereck against
the background of this pro-lender approach of the Supreme Court, the
Congress, and the Bank Board.
V. THE VIERECK CASE
A. Facts
The Viereck decision encompasses two cases in which separate trial
judges held that due-on-sale clauses, executed before June 1, 1979, on
borrower-occupied residential property were unenforceable absent a
credit risk to the mortgagee's security interest.2 52 The first case involved
the Viericks, who entered into a mortgage with Peoples Savings and
repeal an existing due-on-sale restriction. However, the state may not retroactively extend
the window period, or expand the types of loans to which the window period applies. Id.
245. 12 C.F.R. § 591.2(p)(2) (1984).
246. Id.
247. See Hohtday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 480-84; supra notes 196-201 and accompanying
text. The court in Holiday Acres specifically considered the effect of due-on-sale clauses
only with respect to residential property held for investment. Id at 484. While the court
did discuss the general effect of due-on-sale clauses on borrower-occupied residential prop-
erty, id. at 482-83, it did not apply that discussion to the decision in Hol'day Acres. Id. at
484. This fact makes the discussion of due-on-sale clauses involving borrower-occupied
residential property dicta.
248. See Gate Co., 324 N.W.2d at 206-07; supra note 198 and accompanying text.
249. See Rom, supra note 129, at 10; supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
250. Geier, Due-On-Sale Clauses Under the Garn-St. Germain Depositog Institutions Act of
1982, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 355, 429 (1983).
251. Wertheim, supra note 208, at 181.
252. Viereck v. Peoples Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1984).
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Loan Association (Peoples) on July 12, 1978 when they purchased their
house. 25 3 The mortgage instrument was a uniform FNMA/FHLMC
form254 and contained a standard due-on-sale clause.2 55 At the time of
origination, Peoples was a state-chartered institution. On May 3, 1982,
however, Peoples became federally-chartered.
2 56
In 1980, the Vierecks purchased a new home and attempted to sell
their old home on a contract for deed. 25 7 Peoples told the Vierecks that
it would exercise the due-on-sale clause and accelerate payment of the
balance due.258 When the Vierecks discovered they could not close the
sale if the Peoples' mortgage was unassumable, they were forced to rent
out the property and brought a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine whether the due-on-sale clause was enforceable.2 59 The trial court
found the clause unenforceable absent a risk to Peoples' security interest
or an increased credit risk.
26°
The second case involved the Hueys, who mortgaged their owner-oc-
cupied residential property to Knutson Mortgage and Financial Corpo-
ration (Knutson), a state-chartered lending institution.261 The Hueys'
mortgage was also on a uniform FNMA/FHLMC form containing a
due-on-sale clause.262 A few weeks after the Hueys' mortgage was exe-
cuted, Knutson assigned the mortgage to First State Federal Savings and
Loan Association (First State), a federally-chartered institution.263 In
December 1979, the Hueys contacted First State requesting permission to
sell their house on a contract for deed without refinancing the original
loan.264 First State said that it would exercise the due-on-sale clause.
2 65
The property was sold prior to October 15, 1982,266 and the Hueys
brought an action for summary judgment against the mortgagee. 26 7 The
trial court, like the Vireck trial court, held the clause unenforceable un-
less the lender's security interest was at risk.
268
253. Id. at 32.
254. The mortgage instrument was a uniform instrument developed by the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora-
tion (FHLMC). Id at 32 n.1.
255. Id at 32.
256. Id. at 33.




261. Id at 32-33.
262. Id.
263. Id at 33.
264. Id
265. See id
266. See Wertheim, Due-On-Sale Case Comment: Retroactiviy of the Garn Act, 2 MINN. REAL
EST. L.J. 13, 14 (1984).
267. 343 N.W.2d at 33.
268. Id The trial court concluded that federal law, which generally enforces due-on-
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B. The Court's Decision
On appeal, Peoples and First State argued that the Garn Act and
Bank Board regulations preempted Minnesota law governing the exer-
cise of a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage executed prior to June 1,
1979.269 Pursuant to the Garn Act, the lenders asserted that the Minne-
sota window period only covered loans originating on or after June 1,
1979, and before May 9, 1981.270 Therefore, because the mortgage
before the court was executed prior to June 1, 1979, Peoples and First
State argued that the Garn Act and the Bank Board regulations allowed
enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.271 Despite the fact that the lend-
ing institutions were state-chartered when the mortgages originated, the
lenders also relied on de la Cuesta, which held that federally-chartered
institutions could exercise the due-on-sale clause under the federal
regulations.272
The Minnesota court found the appellants' reliance on de la Cuesta
"misplaced." 273 The court reasoned that de la Cuesta and the 1976 Bank
Board regulations did not apply to mortgages originated by state-
chartered institutions.274 The court held that a mortgage originated by a
state lending institution was not subject to the preemptive 1983 Regula-
tions and the Garn Act merely because the mortgage was assigned to a
federal institution or because the state lending institution converted to a
federal association.2 75
By acknowledging the window period, the court recognized the need
to ensure that mortgagors who had executed their loans prior to the
Garn Act enactment date of October 15, 1982, in reliance on state law
restricting enforcement of due-on-sale clauses, would be protected during
the transition period between October 15, 1982 and October 15, 1985.276
sale clauses, did not preempt state law in this case because the mortgage was executed
before June 1, 1979. Minnesota common law considered due-on-sale clauses on borrower-
occupied residences unenforceable as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id at 34. The lenders contended that until the enactment of subdivision 6 of
Minnesota Statutes section 47.20, Minnesota law was silent as to the enforcement of due-
on-sale clauses. Id. at 34 n.4.
271. See id. In other words, the restriction against due-on-sale clauses applied only to
mortgages originating during the window period. Id
272. Id. at 33.
273. Id. at 33-34.
274. Id at 33. See generally Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910, 922-
23 (4th Cir. 1981); Bleecker Assoc. v. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 544 F. Supp. 794,
797-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Comment, supra note 121, at 913 (impairment of contractual
rights is a tenuous argument because the Garn Act and de la Cuesla enforce rather than
impair literal terms of mortgage contracts).
275. See Wertheim, supra note 266, at 13; see also id. at 13 n.2 (noting that the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board has disclaimed authority to regulate mortgages not originated by
federal associations).
276. Viereck, 343 N.W.2d at 34.
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The court concluded that a contrary decision would allow a state-
chartered institution to circumvent this policy by merely acquiring a fed-
eral charter or assigning loans to federal institutions.
277
The court then addressed the Garn Act and found that neither the Act
nor the 1983 Regulations could be applied retroactively.278 This conclu-
sion was based on the court's finding that the Garn Act did not contain a
clear expression of retroactive intent.2 79 In addition, the court noted
that Congress had recognized that state law would apply in some cases
under a window period exemption. 280 Examining the Garn Act, the
court found no provision allowing retroactive application of the federal
preemption provision. Therefore, the appellants could not accelerate the
payment of mortgage balances when the mortgagors seek to transfer the
mortgage on borrower-occupied residential property.
28 '
The court reiterated its Holiday Acres dicta that lenders and mortgagors
do not have equal bargaining power in a borrower-occupied residential
mortgage transaction. 282 The acceleration of a mortgage or the imposi-
tion of a substantially higher interest rate imposes a penalty on a mortga-
gor and adversely restricts his opportunity to sell his property. 283 He
must often sell as a result of a new job or job transfer,284 and the enforce-
ment of a due-on-sale clause on borrower-occupied residential property
amounts to a restraint on alienation.285 Therefore, the Viereck court




The Viereck court's holding that mortgages originated or transferred
prior to June 1, 1979 are not preempted by the Garn Act and the federal
regulations is confusing. The Viereck court examined the Garn Act only
for express language of retroactive preemption.28 7 While statutes gener-
277. Id at 34; see also Williams, 651 F.2d at 922; BleeckerAssoc., 544 F. Supp. at 798-99.
278. See Viereck, 343 N.W.2d at 34; of United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S.
70, 79 (1982).
279. Viereck, 343 N.W.2d at 34. "Absent [a provision providing for retroactive applica-
tion], the preemption provisions of the Garn Act apply to loans originated or transferred
after October 15, 1982, the effective date of the act." Id
280. Id. at 34. The court did not determine when the Minnesota window period com-
mences and expires, nor did it hold that the Viereck mortgage was a window period mort-
gage. Id. at 35 n.5.
281. Id at 34-35. See generally Wertheim, supra note 266, at 13.
282. 343 N.W.2d at 35 (citing Holiday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 482).
283. Id (citing Hohday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 481).
284. Id (citing Holiday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 482).
285. Id. (citing Holiday Acres, 308 N.W.2d at 482-84); see also Volkmer, The Application of
the Restraints on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REV. 747, 773-
74 (1973).
286. See 343 N.W.2d at 36; Wertheim, supra note 266, at 13.
287. See 343 N.W.2d 30, 34-35.
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ally have a prospective effect, a statute can operate retroactively if Con-
gress' intent to impose a retroactive effect is expressly stated 288 or clearly
shown by necessary implication.289 The court did not analyze the neces-
sary implications of the Garn Act's language. Although the Garn Act
does not specifically state that all mortgages executed prior to the Act are
not covered by a window period exception, and therefore contain en-
forceable due-on-sale clauses, such a provision can be implied. Section
341(b)(1) provides, "Notwithstanding any provision of the Constitution
or laws (including the judicial decisions) of any State to the contrary, a
lender may, subject to subsection (c), of this section enter into or enforce
any contract containing a due-on-sale clause with respect to a real prop-
erty loan."290 Section 341(c)(1) creates the window period exception
which appears to cover a time period prior to the enactment of the Garn
Act. 29 1 Therefore, by implication the Garn Act must apply retroactively.
If it did not, there would be no need to carve out a window period excep-
tion, since all mortgages originated or assumed before October 15, 1982
would be unaffected by the Garn Act. 292 In essence, Congress would not
have granted window period protection to mortgages originated or trans-
ferred in the past if the Garn Act was not intended to apply retroactively.
The legislative history underlying the Garn Act also supports this in-
terpretation2 93 Congress found compelling reasons to allow lenders to
update existing mortgages. 294 This policy would be thwarted if the Garn
Act had only a prospective effect for outstanding mortgages held by lend-
ers on the date the Act was enacted.
In addition, an exclusively prospective effect would not satisfy congres-
sional concerns in the secondary mortgage market.29 5 State-chartered
savings and loan associations face large financial losses arising from state
restrictions on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses. These losses
288. Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 266 U.S. 435, 437 (1925).
289. United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & Tex. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 1, 3 (1926).
290. Title IV, § 341(b)(1), 96 Stat. 1505 (1982) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1701j-3(b)(1) (West Supp. 1983)).
291. Id § 341(c)(1). See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 98.
292. See Wertheim, supra note 266, at 14 ("If the Garn act did not intend to reach any
mortgages originated prior to October 15, 1982, absolutely no purpose was served by carv-
ing out a window period based on state law restrictions for only certain mortgages
originated or assumed prior to October 15, 1982.").
293. See 128 CONG. REC. S12,212-64 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Garn). Senator Garn stated, "Section 341 of the bill will not affect state personal property
rights, state securities statutes, or state foreclosure laws as long as they are not used to
inhibit or obstruct the Congressional purpose of allowing lenders to enforce due-on-sale
clauses in real property loans." Id at S12,235.
294. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98; TASK FORCE, supra note 100.
295. See generally Note, supra note 121 and accompanying text (the primary concern is
that unenforceable due-on-sale clauses would render loans less marketable in secondary
markets since loans could not be refinanced at current interest levels).
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would not be alleviated if the Garn Act did not apply retroactively.296
The primary legislative policy of strengthening home lending institu-
tions cannot be realized unless the Garn Act applies retroactively.297
The Minnesota Supreme Court's holding that mortgages originating
before June 1, 1979 are not affected by the Garn Act contravenes the Act
and the 1983 Regulations' purpose of validating all due-on-sale clauses
with the exception of those falling within window periods.2 98
In concluding that the Garn Act does not apply retroactively to mort-
gages executed prior to June 1, 1979, the Vzerec* court relied on the poli-
cies underlying the window period exception. The court, however, failed
to establish the dates of the Minnesota window period and whether the
Vierecks' or the Hueys' mortgages fell within a window period.2 99 Al-
though defining a window period for Minnesota was clearly within the
court's power, 30 0 it declined to make that determination.301 A clear de-
termination of the Minnesota window period would have added cer-
tainty to Minnesota mortgage law for the transitional period ending on
October 15, 1985.
Instead of following the policies set forth by de la Cuesta, the Garn Act
and the 1983 Regulations, the Minnesota court went to extremes to pro-
tect Minnesota homeowners by erroneously applying Minnesota law to
hold that the Garn Act and the Regulations do not apply to a non-feder-
ally originated pre-October 15, 1982 mortgage. In Viereck, the court
brought its Holiday Acres dicta back to life in the form of a holding which
strongly voices support for pro-consumer mortgagor law.302 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court must have been aware that the issue would be moot
by October 15, 1985, before there would be a chance to appeal the Vier-
eck decision. The court, therefore, continued its pro-mortgagor policy
voiced in earlier decisions.303
296. See CONG. REC. S 12,213 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1982) (statement of Rep. Riegle).
297. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 98; TASK FORCE, supra note 100.
298. See Wertheim, supra note 264, at 14 ("The basic purpose of the Garn Act was to
validate due-on-sale clauses across the board except where pre-Garn expectations based on
window periods were to be respected.").
299. See 343 N.W.2d 30, 35 (court noted that both parties argued extensively about
when the window period begins and ends in Minnesota, court did not provide an answer
to that issue); Wertheim, supra note 266, at 13 ("The Minnesota court declined to decide
whether the two pre-June 1, 1979, mortgages were subject to a window period exception.
Rather, the court held that the Garn Act did not apply retroactively to the two
mortgages").
300. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 98, at 3076-78.
301. See 343 N.W.2d at 35 n.5.
302. Id. at 35-36.
303. See generally Cross Co., Inc. v. Citizens Mortgage Inv. Trust, 305 Minn. 111, 232
N.W.2d 114 (1975) (after mortgagee purchased property at foreclosure sale, it was not
entitled to possession or rents during statutory redemption period despite mortgagor's as-
signment of lease to mortgagee); Gandrud v. Hansen, 210 Minn. 125, 297 N.W. 730, 733-
34 (1941) (mortgagor may dispose of his equity in mortgaged property when and as he
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As a result of Vireck, Minnesota homeowners will be able to transfer
non-federally originated loans created before October 15, 1982 without
worry that the due-on-sale clauses will be exercised. 304 Minnesota real-
tors, home sellers, and home buyers would be at a great advantage to
transfer mortgages qualifying under Vireck before October 15, 1985.3 0 5
According to Viereck, Minnesota lenders must permit transfers of mort-
gages qualifying under Viereck without exercising their due-on-sale
clauses. 306 Therefore, prior to October 15, 1985, home owners can sell
their houses with mortgages meeting the Viereck standards without de-
creasing the selling price to compensate for mortgage refinancing. Like-
wise, home buyers can purchase those homes without refinancing at a
high current interest rate. Viereck greatly boosts the Minnesota real estate
market, yet disadvantages the lending institutions who must continue to
hold Viereck mortgages with below market interest rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Viereck, the Minnesota Supreme Court reacted to the steady pro-
mortgagee trend embodied in de la Cuesta, the Garn Act, and the 1983
Regulations by making a last stand for the occupying homeowner-mort-
gagor. While the holding that non-federally originated residential mort-
gages created prior to October 15, 1982 may be transferred without
enforcement of due-on-sale clauses has great impact on the Minnesota
real estate market and on affected lending institutions, the impact is
short-lived. The Viereck decision which reinstated the pro-mortgagor Hol-
iday Acres stance will be moot on October 15, 1985.
pleases); Twenty Assocs., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 200 Minn. 211, 273 N.W.
696, 698 (1937) (mortgagor may not, as part of a mortgage transaction, bargain away his
equity of redemption; any attempt to do so will not be enforced by a court of equity);
Sanderson v. Engel, 182 Minn. 256, 234 N.W. 450, 451 (1931) (mortgagor's right to re-
deem cannot be extinguished by agreement made at time of the transaction); Niggeler v.
Maurin, 34 Minn. 118, 24 N.W. 369 (1885) (in doubtful cases a land transaction will
generally be construed as a mortgage rather than a conditional sale to save forfeiture).
304. Kiereck, 343 N.W.2d 30, 34.
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